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INTRODUCTION
In April of 2007, thirty-one year old Valerie Stephenson attempted to file
her federal income taxes for the first time.1 Unsure how to pay the small
liability she owed, Valerie telephoned the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
to inquire how to proceed.2 However, in addition to receiving payment
instructions, Valerie learned she had a massive liability of $77,865, which
stemmed from her 1999 federal income tax return, which she had jointly
filed with her ex-husband, Sean.3
Valerie was extremely troubled by this news—during the marriage, Sean
had sole control over the family’s finances.4 He did not allow Valerie
access to the filing cabinet that contained the couple’s checkbook and
financial documents, both of which required a key that only Sean
possessed.5 When Sean needed Valerie to sign something, he placed the
document in front of her and told her where to sign the document.6 Any
time Valerie inquired about the contents of the document, Sean made
threats of violence or mocked her for being unable to understand the
document’s contents.7 Furthermore, Sean physically assaulted Valerie on
several occasions, but she had remained in the relationship for fear of
retaliation.8 With less than a high school education,9 no job,10 and over
1. Stephenson v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1048, 1050
(2011).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 1048-49.
4. Id. at 1048. According to the United States Tax Court, Valerie and Sean had
one joint checking account, but most of Valerie’s purchases had to be approved by
Sean. Id. at n.4.
5. Id. at 1048. According to the court, Valerie had to hide important personal
documents from Sean, such as her birth certificate and passport. Id. at n.7
6. Id. at 1048.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1049. In 2003, Valerie had attempted to leave Sean. Id. However, Sean
threatened to kill her or himself if she left him. Id. Valerie testified that she was so
frightened by the encounter, that she decided to remain married to Sean. Id.
9. Id. at 1048. The alleged facts reveal that Valerie dropped out of high school
during her junior year in order to follow her ex-husband, Sean, out to California. Id.
Valerie also attempted unsuccessfully to earn her GED three times. Id.
10. Id. at 1050. At the time Valerie learned about the 1999 liability, she had
divorced Sean and was renting a room in a friend’s house. Id. Since then, Valerie held
four jobs and quit three of them. Id. Her current income is ten dollars an hour. Id. at
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$10,000 in unpaid rent, Valerie’s $77,865 tax liability appeared
insurmountable.
Unfortunately, Valerie’s case is not uncommon. In fact, it is estimated
that 50,000 individuals a year face income tax liabilities stemming from
marriage.11 Furthermore, only twenty-two percent of these cases receive
full relief.12 The Internal Revenue Code (the Code) provides that when a
married couple signs a joint return, each spouse will be jointly and
severally liable for the amount of tax due as well as any other resulting
liabilities.13 As demonstrated by Valerie’s case, an “innocent spouse” will
be liable for tax deficiencies belonging to her spouse, even if she had no
knowledge of the liabilities or knew of the liabilities but feared to confront
her spouse with them, as is quite common within the domestic violence
context.14
Prior to 1998, relief was available to innocent spouses but under rather
restrictive conditions.15 In 1998, as part of the IRS Restructuring and
Reform Act of 1998 (RRA), Congress enacted legislation that granted
several exceptions to joint and several liability.16 Section 6015, known as
the innocent spouse provision, offers three avenues of relief: (1) a release
from all liabilities because the innocent spouse had no knowledge of any
understatements or deficiencies;17 (2) partial liability if the spouses are now
divorced or separated and the innocent spouse elects to have her liability
n.18.
11. Aiding Innocent Spouses from Joint Tax Liabilities, YOURABA, Sept. 2011,
http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/youraba/201109article09.html; see
also Jason Alderman, “Innocent Spouse Relief” Protects Against Tax Fraud,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 28, 2012, 1:24 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jasonalderman/innocent-spouse-relief_b_1631665.html (stating that each year tens of
thousands of people file for “Innocent Spouse Relief” with the IRS).
12. Carla Fried, For “Innocent Spouses,” a Helpful Shift in I.R.S. Policy, N.Y.
(Feb.
11,
2012),
TIMES
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/12/business/yourtaxes/innocent-spouses-get-morerelief-from-irs.html.
13. I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (2013).
14. See Stephenson, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1052.
15. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-558, TAX ADMINISTRATION:
IRS’S INNOCENT SPOUSE PROGRAM PERFORMANCE IMPROVED; BALANCED
PERFORMANCE MEASURE NEEDED 03 (Apr. 2002); see also I.R.C. § 6013, repealed by
Pub. L. 105-206, tit. III, § 3201(e)(1), 112 Stat. 740 (1998).
16. I.R.C. § 6015 (2013). Prior to 1998, there was only one way to obtain
innocent spouse relief under the now-repealed § 6013(e). RRA of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-206, 112 Stat. 685, 734-35 (1998). The only way that an innocent spouse could
obtain relief under § 6013(e) was in the instance of a substantial understatement of tax.
Id.
17. I.R.C. § 6015(b)(1)(C).
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limited to only items which would be allocable to her;18 and (3)
discretionary equitable relief for those taxpayers who can demonstrate that
full payment of the liability would be unfair because of the presence of
factors like economic hardship and abuse.19
While the creation of innocent spouse relief has provided tax assistance
to many taxpayers, the factors currently used by the IRS and the United
States Tax Court (Tax Court) often produce inequitable results when the
taxpayer is a victim of domestic abuse. Currently, the Code provides no
guidance for how the Tax Court should assess the merits of a claim of
abuse.20 Even more troubling is the fact that Tax Court opinions contain
conflicting and often unattainable requirements for how taxpayers must
corroborate abuse claims. For instance, some judges will not uphold the
claim unless a personal protection order has been granted;21 other judges
deem the abuse “not serious” if the couple has joint custody of a child.22
These judicially created requirements fail to account for the power and
control dynamics of domestic abuse, even when the actual relationship
between the parties has terminated.
An empirical analysis was conducted on the sixty Tax Court cases where
a spouse seeking innocent spouse relief also alleged the presence of
domestic violence in the relationship. This study examined whether and
with what evidence the Tax Court upholds claims of domestic violence,
and whether finding that domestic violence exists significantly impacts the
taxpayer’s ability to attain equitable relief under §6015(f). Finally, in lieu
of the empirical results, two additional areas for expansion in the IRS’s
newly proposed innocent spouse regulation are suggested, which would
provide Tax Court judges with a list of non-exhaustive criteria to utilize in
analyzing a claim of abuse. The goal is to provide equitable tax relief to
18. I.R.C. § 6015(c)(3)(A)(i)(1).
19. I.R.C. § 6015 (f).
20. All that exists is Revenue Procedure Ruling 2003-61, which gives a list of

several factors that should be examined by the Tax Court when it assess claims for
innocent spouse relief. See Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-32 I.R.B. 296.
21. See Acoba v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, No. 4002-05S, 2010 WL 1993610,
at *5 (T.C. May 19, 2010) (“The [order enjoined] Acoba from “assaulting, harassing,
molesting or disturbing the peace of” petitioner . . . [b]ut there is no evidence to
indicate whether the restraining order was the result of historical abuse or was a
prophylactic measure taken by the court as an outcome of the divorce.”).
22. See Sotuyo v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, No. 25692-10S, 2012 WL
1021306, at *5 (T.C. Mar. 27, 2012) (“Petitioners sought and received joint legal and
shared physical custody of their daughter . . . and the family court did not order
supervised visitation. . . . Ms. Caro’s evidence of abuse does not rise to the level of
abuse that would keep her from challenging the omission of income for fear of Mr.
Sotuyo’s retaliation.”).
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victims of domestic abuse who, because of the misconceptions of domestic
violence in the present tax system, might otherwise be unsuccessful in their
endeavors.
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF INNOCENT SPOUSE LAW
Reform in the Code has never come swiftly for married couples.
Although spouses first faced joint and several liability beginning in 1938,23
it was not until 1971, thirty-three years later, that any sort of relief was
available to innocent spouses.24 Therefore, until 1971, a woman who
lacked knowledge of her husband’s misstated income or who complied
with his demands for her signature out of fear of retaliation was not only
left without relief, but she was often on the hook for massive liabilities.25
In 1998, three distinct provisions were created to provide innocent spouse
relief—sections 6015(b), (c), and (f). For purposes of this Article, only
subsection (f) will be considered.
A. Equitable Relief Under § 6015(f)
Subsection (f) grants a spouse relief from either a tax understatement or
underpayment if “taking into account all of the facts and circumstances, it
would be inequitable” to hold her liable.26 In order to assist IRS
employees’ analysis of whether a requesting spouse should be entitled to
equitable relief, the Commissioner prescribed a series of revenue procedure
guidelines.27 According to Revenue Ruling 2003-61, a requesting spouse
must satisfy seven threshold conditions before the Commissioner will
consider a request for equitable relief.28 If these initial seven conditions are
23. See Revenue Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 554, § 51(b), 52 Stat. 447 (1939).
Scholars have posited that the reasons for creating joint return liability are unknown.
See Richard C.E. Beck, The Failure of Innocent Spouse Reform, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 929, 934 (2006) (arguing that although some argue joint and several liability was
thought to have been created due to the economic nature of the family, “[t]here is no
evidence, however, that couples ordinarily share all or most of their property, much less
that they ignore separate ownership to such an extent that they can be presumed
indifferent to . . . tax liability”).
24. Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-679, § 1, 84 Stat. 2063 (1971) (codified
at I.R.C. § 6013(e)).
25. For example, in the case of Scudder v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the
wife was held liable by the Tax Court for the assessed tax that was the result of her
husband’s embezzling endeavors, of which she had no knowledge. Scudder v. Comm’r
of Internal Revenue, 48 T.C. 36, 41 (1967).
26. I.R.C. § 6015(f).
27. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-32 I.R.B. 296.
28. Id. The seven threshold conditions include: (1) IRC Sections 6015(b) and (c)
are not available, (2) there was a timely application for relief, (3) there is no evidence
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satisfied, the requesting spouse can automatically qualify for equitable
relief if she further meets three “safe harbor” factors: (1) she is legally
separated or divorced from the non-requesting spouse at the time relief was
requested; (2) she had no knowledge or reason to know at the time the
return was signed that the non-requesting spouse would not pay the
liability;29 and (3) she would suffer economic hardship if relief is not
granted.30
The requesting spouse must meet all three requirements in order to
qualify for the safe harbor provision.31 When a requesting spouse fails to
satisfy the safe harbor conditions, the Commissioner may determine
through a balancing test whether equitable relief is appropriate.32 Revenue
Ruling 2003-61 contains a non-exhaustive list of balancing factors to be
utilized in deciding whether an innocent spouse should be granted equitable
relief.33 Furthermore, the Ruling provides that “no single factor will be
determinative in any particular case.”34 In addition to the three safe harbor
factors, additional inquiries include whether the requesting spouse received
a significant benefit from the nonpayment of taxes, was abused, or was in
poor mental or physical health at the time of signing the relief.35
When balancing the non-exhaustive list of factors, the IRS will
determine whether the factor weighs in favor of relief, weighs against
relief, or is neutral.36 The two factors that are the most applicable in the
of fraudulent transfers of assets, (4) there is no evidence of disqualified assets
transferred, (5) there is no evidence a fraudulent joint return was presented, (6) the tax
is attributable to the non-requesting spouse, and (7) a joint return was filed. Id.
29. In determining whether the requesting spouse had reason to know, the court
inquires into (1) the requesting spouse’s level of education, (2) any deceit or
evasiveness of the nonrequesting spouse, (3) the requesting spouse’s degree of
involvement in the activity generating the income tax liability, (4) the requesting
spouse’s involvement in business and household financial matters, (5) the requesting
spouse’s financial expertise, and (6) any lavish expenditures. Rev. Proc. 2003-61,
2003-32 I.R.B. 296, § 4.03(2)(a)(iii)(C).
30. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-32 I.R.B. 296, § 4.03(2)(a)(ii); see also Butner v.
Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) 136, 151 (2007). To determine
economic hardship, the IRS will use the factors provided in § 301.6343-1(b)(4)
including (1) the requesting spouse’s age, employment status, history, ability to earn,
and number of dependents, (2) the amount reasonably necessary for food, clothing,
housing, medical expenses, and transportation, (3) costs of living in the geographic
area, and (4) any other factor the requesting spouse presents.
31. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-32 I.R.B. 296, § 4.02(1)(a)-(c).
32. Butner, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) at 154.
33. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-32 I.R.B. 296, § 4.03(2)(a)-(b).
34. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-32 I.R.B. 296, § 4.03(2).
35. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-32 I.R.B. 296, § 4.03(2)(a)(C)(v).
36. See Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-32 I.R.B. 296 § 4.03(2)(a)(B).
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domestic violence context are whether the requesting spouse had
knowledge of the liability and whether she can prove that she was abused
throughout the relationship. If the requesting spouse fails to prove that she
lacked knowledge or had no reason to know, this factor will weigh against
relief; however, if she cannot prove that she was abused, this factor will be
neutral and not weigh against relief.37
B. Duress Versus Abuse and the Knowledge Requirement
Although duress and abuse require many of the same pieces of evidence,
they differ when the events occur. Duress relates to the moment the return
is signed and exists when a spouse forces her spouse to sign a tax return.38
Although not explicitly defined in the Code,39 the Tax Court provided some
guidance in the 1966 case of Stanley v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue.40 In Stanley, the Tax Court found that, although the requesting
spouse had suffered long-term physical abuse at the hands of her husband,
she failed to show that she signed the tax return under duress.41 The
Stanley court stated, “Not only must fear be produced in order to constitute
duress, but the fear must be a cause inducing entrance into a transaction . . .
without which the transaction would not have occurred.”42 Thus, although
the requesting spouse lived in constant fear of her husband, the requisite
causal link between fear and signing the return was not established.43
On the contrary, in Hiramanek v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the
requesting spouse was viciously beat by her husband after she refused to
sign the couple’s tax return.44 The wife had recorded in her diary numerous
instances of threats against her life, physical assault, and verbal abuse
leading up to the evening when her husband demanded that she sign the
return.45 The next day, when presented with the return, which still had an
incorrect deduction, the wife signed out of fear of another violent attack.46
37. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-32 I.R.B. 296, § 4.03(2)(b)(i)-(ii).
38. Brown v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 51 T.C. 116, 119-20 (1968).
39. The Tax Court has only held “[d]uress may exist not only when a gun is held

to one’s head while a signature is being subscribed to a document. A long-continued
course of mental intimidation can be equally effective, and perhaps more so, as a form
of duress.” Brown, 51 T.C. at 119-20 (1968).
40. See Stanley v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 45 T.C. 555, 564 (1986).
41. Id. at 565-66.
42. Id. at 563.
43. Id. at 565-66.
44. Hiramanek v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 102 T.C.M. (CCH) 546, 550
(2011).
45. Id. at 549.
46. Id. at 550.
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The court analyzed two prongs in finding that she signed the return under
duress: (1) that she was unable to resist her spouse’s demands that she sign
the return, and (2) that the requesting spouse would not have signed the
returns without the constraint the spouse placed on her.47 If duress is
proven, courts hold that no joint return was filed, thereby relieving the
coerced spouse of the joint liability.48
If the IRS rejects the duress argument, however, then the requesting
spouse must establish that she is entitled to innocent spouse relief from
joint liability.49 Abuse not amounting to duress differs from duress in two
key aspects: (1) abusive conduct is viewed as being less severe, and (2) the
abusive conduct occurred either before or after the return was signed.50
Although abusive conduct may not amount to duress, it can still weigh in
favor of relief and also mitigate the knowledge requirement. For instance,
in Venables v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Tax Court initially
held that because the requesting spouse knew her family was experiencing
financial difficulty at the time she signed the return, the knowledge factor
weighed against relief.51 However, the Tax Court acknowledged that her
husband exerted financial control over her by threatening her with physical
harm every time she asked to make a withdrawal from the couple’s joint
checking account.52 The Venables court thus concluded that the financial
and physical abuse the requesting taxpayer suffered mitigated the
knowledge requirement and she ultimately was granted relief.53 The abuse
factor will be discussed in more detail below in relation to what pieces of
evidence the court examines when assessing a claim of abuse, as well as
the potential biases and inconsistencies that often emerge in the analyses.
II. EMPIRICAL STUDY
Scholars have estimated that since the RRA was enacted, the IRS has
received over 1,000 applications for innocent spouse relief per week.54
47. Id. at 554-55; see also Brown, 51 T.C. at 119. Important to note is that the Tax
Court considers the totality of the circumstances under a “wholly subjective standard.”
Id.
48. Id. at 119.
49. See Stergios v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) 1057, 1061
(2009).
50. See Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-32 I.R.B. 296, § 4.03(2)(a)(ii).
51. Venables v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, No. 22068-08S, 2010 WL 1980316,
at *6 (T.C. May 18, 2010).
52. Id. at *1.
53. Id. at *7.
54. See Kari Smoker, Comment, Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and
Reform Act of 1998: Expanded Relief for Innocent Spouses—At What Cost? A
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One issue that has consistently baffled both the IRS and the Tax Court is
the interplay between domestic violence and innocent spouse cases.55 In
Nihiser v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,56 Judge Holmes expressed
his frustration with how courts handle allegations of domestic violence,
stating that “[t]his is not a terribly well developed corner of tax law, and it
is not one in which we can really get much help by looking at detailed
regulations or the ordinary canons of construction.”57 Similarly, scholars
have noted that, in general, there has been a lack of empirical research into
innocent spouse cases and even less investigation into how Tax Court
judges respond to allegations of domestic abuse.58
In 2011, Professor Stephanie McMahon from the University of
Cincinnati College of Law conducted an empirical study of 444 litigated
claims for innocent spouse relief between 1998 and 2011.59 Professor
McMahon looked at the factors listed under Revenue Ruling 2003-61 that
the Tax Court examines in an innocent spouse case.60 This Article goes
into more depth on the issue of abuse and examines the fifty-six cases
where the requesting spouse claimed she was abused by the non-requesting
spouse during the marriage.61 It evaluates the differences between cases
where the abuse claim was sustained versus denied in order to ascertain
what factors courts are evaluating when a claim of abuse is presented.62

Feminist Perspective, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 2045, 2088 (1999); Steve Johnson, The 1998
Act and the Resources Link Between Tax Compliance and Tax Simplification, 51 U.
KAN. L. REV. 1013, 1044 (2003).
55. See Fed Stokeld, Taxpayer Advocate Blasts IRS’s Handling of Innocent Spouse
Case,
TAX
NOTES,
Jan.
31,
2011,
http://www.woodporter.com/Publications/Articles/pdf/Taxpayer_Advocate_Blasts_IRS
_Handling.pdf (describing how National Taxpayer Advocate Nina Olson criticized the
IRS for “display[ing] an astonishing ignorance about what happens to people in
abusive relationships”].
56. Nihiser v. Comm’r, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1531, 1531 (2008).
57. Id. at 1541.
58. See Michael Bommarito et al., An Empirical Survey of the Populations of U.S.
Tax Court Written Decisions, 30 VA. TAX. REV. 523, 526 (2011); Daniel M. Schneider,
Empirical Research on Judicial Reasoning: Statutory Interpretation in Federal Tax
Cases, 31 N.M. L. REV. 325, 325 (2001).
59. Stephanie Hunter McMahon, An Empirical Study of Innocent Spouse Relief:
Do Courts Implement Congress’s Legislative Intent?, 12 FLA. TAX REV. 629, 635
(2012) [hereinafter McMahon Study].
60. Id. at 631.
61. Id. at 694-95.
62. Id. at 695.
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A. Brief Explanation of the McMahon Study
The cases used in this study include all recorded tax decisions in the
Westlaw database handed down between November 16, 2000, and March
30, 2013, that included the words “innocent spouse,” “tax,” “6015,” and
“abuse.” The 444 cases used for the McMahon Study were narrowed down
using the Westlaw search terms to those fifty-six instances where the
spouse seeking relief alleged that domestic violence occurred during the
marriage. Each case was coded for a variety of information and compiled
into a spreadsheet, including information about the parties (gender,
education, employment history, etc.) and their relationship (type of abuse,
evidence of abuse, role in family finances, etc.). While the purpose of the
McMahon Study was to examine patterns within cases,63 this Article takes
on the additional task of examining the variables utilized by the Tax Court
to determine whether to uphold or reject an abuse claim.
This study focuses exclusively on cases handled by the Tax Court as this
court is where a majority of taxpayers seeking innocent spouse relief appeal
the IRS’s denial of their claims.64 It is important to note that the study does
not include every innocent spouse case heard by the Tax Court where abuse
was alleged. Much like the McMahon Study, only so much information
can be gathered from cases located on research databases. Many cases are
unpublished or settled before litigation,65 and many others never reach
litigation because requesting spouses often do not have the resources to
appeal an IRS decision.
B. The Requesting Spouse: Profile of a Battered Taxpayer
One of the many misconceptions of domestic violence is the expectation
that a victim fit a particular stereotype.66 This stereotype is often a woman
belonging to a lower socioeconomic class who is perhaps a racial minority
or a recent immigrant.67 The fear many scholars share is that judges
63. Id. at 648.
64. Id. at 648, 650-51. According to the McMahon Study, 89.2% of all appeals

from IRS decisions were brought before the Tax Court. Id. The remaining percentages
of cases were split between the Court of Claims, District Courts, and Circuit Courts.
Id.
65. See Bommarito et al., supra note 58, at 530 (noting that “not all cases that are
filed result in a written opinion. . . . Some are settled before a judgment can be
reached, and others result in an unwritten bench opinion”).
66. Cynthia Willis Esqueda & Lisa A. Harrison, The Influence of Gender Role
Stereotypes, the Woman’s Race, and Level of Provocation and Resistance on Domestic
Violence Culpability Attributions, 53 SEX ROLES 821, 822 (2005); Zanita E. Fenton,
Domestic Violence in Black and White: Racialized Gender Stereotypes in Gender
Violence, 8 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 6, 10 (1998).
67. See Alana Bowman, A Matter of Justice: Overcoming Juror Bias in
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inexperienced in handling domestic violence matters will view a victim’s
claim with less credibility if she does not conform to a specific
stereotype.68 Thus, to prove that there is no stereotypical victim, it is
necessary to explore the diverse profiles of domestic violence victims who
seek innocent spouse relief from the Tax Court. Furthermore, it is also
essential to investigate whether, despite the lack of a single victim profile,
Tax Court judges are still awarding relief based on stereotypes.
1. Gender of the Requesting Spouse
The RRA was originally crafted to provide relief to female taxpayers
who were unknowing victims of liabilities attributable to their spouses.69
According to a 1998 Congressional Conference Report, 90% of the
innocent spouse cases brought before the passage of the RRA were by
women.70 Similarly, the McMahon Study found that women continue to
make up the majority of requesting spouses, with 338 women, as opposed
to 59 men bringing cases before the Tax Court, representing 85% of the
cases.71 The following chart illustrates the number of women as compared
to men who have sought innocent spouse and alleged they were abused by
their spouse.

Prosecutions of Batterers Through Expert Witness Testimony of the Common
Experiences of Battered Women, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 219, 242 (1992)
(explaining that jurors in criminal cases have certain expectations of who the victim is
and victims who do not fit within a particular stereotype are bewildering to the jurors).
Similarly, there are additional false impressions as to the identity of the batterer. See
James Martin Truss, The Subjection of Women . . . Still: Unfulfilled Promises of
Protection for Women Victims of Domestic Violence, 26 St. Mary’s L.J. 1149, 1167
(1995).
68. See MARY ANN DUTTON, NAT’L ONLINE RES. CTR. ON VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN, UPDATE OF THE “BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME” CRITIQUE 4 (Aug. 2009),
available at http://www.vawnet.org/Assoc_Files_VAWnet/AR_BWSCritique.pdf;
Wendy McElroy, Domestic Violence: Behind the Stereotypes, IFEMINISTS.COM (Nov.
10,
2004),
http://www.ifeminists.net/introduction/editorials/2004/1110.html
(“[S]tereotypes that have defined the issue of domestic violence are inadequate and
they are hurting victims who do not conform”); Martha Shaffer & Nicholas Bala, The
Role of Family Courts in Domestic Violence, in PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: STRATEGIES FOR COMMUNITY INTERVENTION 171, 175 (Peter G.
Jaffe ed., 2004).
69. See 144 Cong. Rec. S7657 (July 8, 1997); S. REP. NO. 89-144, at 7649 (1998)
(CONF. REP.) (“All too often women are stuck holding bills of their ex-husbands, only
then finding out that their ex-spouse had not legally filed a tax return.”).
70. 144 Cong. Rec. S76430-02 (July 8, 1998); see also Stephen Zorn, Innocent
Spouses, Reasonable Women and Divorce, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 421, 424 (1996).
71. McMahon Study, supra note 59, at 662 (noting that women bring
approximately 84.3% of the trial cases and 88% of the appellate cases).
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Gendered Relief
Brought Trial Case
Wife
Husband
55
5

Won Trial Case
Wife
Husband
26 [47.27%]
2 [40%]

Much like the McMahon Study, 91.67% of the requesting taxpayers who
alleged abuse were women.72 Women have won 93% of the total taxpayer
victories where abuse was alleged and, according to the McMahon Study,
89.50% of victories in general.73 Thus, innocent spouse relief in general
and allegations of abuse in particular appear to be gendered within the tax
context.
It is not quite clear how these numbers correlate with allegations of
domestic abuse in other circumstances. Studies that have examined the
gendered nature of domestic abuse have shown extremely inconsistent
results.74 Furthermore, it is important to note that many members of the
judiciary, in both family courts and tax courts, lack an understanding about
domestic violence and its seriousness. Oftentimes, judges and legal
personnel make gender-biased assumptions to the effect that women falsely
raise abuse issues for tactical gain.75 Thus, in analyzing the likelihood that a
woman, because of her gender, is likely to gain innocent spouse relief, it is
crucial to be aware of the persistent biases that exist in the legal field.
Furthermore, it is important for judges to not overlook men when
72. Id. McMahon pointed out that Congress classified innocent spouse relief as a
women’s issue. Id. In McMahon’s study, wives sought innocent spouse relief in 85.4
percent of the total cases, thus corroborating Congress’s claim. Id. Similarly, this study
further perpetuates the idea that it is mostly wives who are seeking innocent spouse
relief.
73. Id.
74. For example, according to a study conducted by the National Coalition Against
Domestic Violence, 85% of domestic violence victims are women. CALLIE MARIE
RENNISON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME DATA BRIEF: INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE,
1993-2001
(2003),
available
at
http://www.ncadv.org/files/DomesticViolenceFactSheet(National).pdf.
However,
according to a 2010 national survey by the U.S. Department of Justice and the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, more men than women were victims of domestic
abuse and over 40% of the severe physical violence was directed at men. NAT’L CTR.
FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
THE NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY (Nov. 2011),
available at http://www.cdc.gov/ViolencePrevention/pdf/NISVS_Report2010-a.pdf.
75. For instance, “[w]omen who raise concerns about a violent partner . . . are
unlikely to be believed because lawyers and judges tend to overemphasize the
possibility that false allegations are being used to further . . . claims.” Peter G. Jaffe, et
al., CHILD CUSTODY AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A CALL FOR SAFETY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY, 17 (2003).
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analyzing their claims of abuse. As noted by many victim advocates, men
are largely silent on issues of domestic abuse because of gender roles and
social stereotypes that hold that men are supposed to be the physically
stronger and more dominant partner in the relationship.76 Furthermore,
men may be less inclined to report instances of abuse because of fear of
ridicule from judges, law enforcement personnel, and the public in
general.77 Therefore, when a man presents a claim of abuse during an
innocent spouse proceeding, there is the chance that he may not have
corroborating documents due to the fact that he did not report the abuse or
that his claim was not taken seriously by police officers or judges because
of his gender. Conversely, there also needs to be an awareness that men
who are abusers may in fact falsely raise accusations of domestic abuse for
a tactical gain in an innocent spouse proceeding.78 Thus, many men
winning protective orders or seeking innocent spouse relief are themselves
abusers who intimidated their partners into being silent or dominated and
controlled their partners in such a way that they did not even recognize that
they were being abused. Lawyers, tax court judges, and legal personnel
need to gain an increased awareness of the multitude of different dynamics
and scenarious that domestic violence plays in an innocent spouse case and
the possibility that the individual seeking relief may in fact be the abuser.
2. Marital Status of the Requesting Spouse
The Tax Court gives great weight to an individual’s marital status at the
time relief is requested.79 A spouse is required to be separated or divorced
before she can attain relief under §6015(c).80 If the requesting spouse is
76. Ruth S., Men: The Overlooked Victims of Domestic Violence, DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE STAT. (May 16, 2012), http://domesticviolencestatistics.org/men-theoverlooked-victims-of-domestic-violence; DENISE A. HINES, OVERLOOKED VICTIMS OF
DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE:
MEN
(2011),
available
at
http://www.clarku.edu/faculty/dhines/May%202011%20Canada%20roundtable%20pre
sentation.pdf (conducting a study of 302 instances of abuse where men between the
ages of eighteen and fifty-nine were the victims).
77. See
Domestic
Violence,
CLARK CNTY. PROSECUTING ATT’Y,
http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/domviol/men.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2014)
(“Men often suffer physical abuse in silence because they are afraid that no one will
believe them or take them seriously. In fact, some men who do try to get help find that
they are mocked and ridiculed.”).
78. For instance, scholars have noted that “genuine batterers routinely denounce
their accuser and commonly retaliate with accusations that their partners are actually
the aggressors, are unfit, or are systematically brainwashing children” Peter G. Jaffe, et
al., CHILD CUSTODY AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A CALL FOR SAFETY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY, 17 (2003).
79. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-32 I.R.B. 296, § 4.03(2)(a)(ii).
80. I.R.C. § 6015(c).
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still married, she may be able to obtain relief under §6015(f), but her
marital status will weigh against her in the Tax Court’s balancing test.81
Unlike “neutral” factors that will not count against the requesting spouse,
marital status is given significant weight and is often determinative of
whether relief is granted.82 The following chart illustrates how the Tax
Court evaluates the requesting spouse’s marital status and whether there is
a correlation between the status and relief.

Married
Separated
(Legally
or
Physically)
Divorced
Widowed
Other/Never
Legally
Married

Married
Separated
(Legally
or
Physically)
Divorced
Widowed
Other/Never
Legally
Married

Marital Status of Those Seeking Relief
At Time of Filing
At Time of Trial
Wife
Husband
Wife
Husband
Requesting Requesting Requesting Requesting
46
5
1
0
4
0
6
2

4
1
0

0
0
0

38
10
0

3
0
0

Marital Status of Winning Taxpayers
At Time of Filing
At Time of Trial
Wife
Husband
Wife
Husband
Requesting Requesting Requesting Requesting
20
2
0
0
1
0
2
1

1
0
0

0
0
0

17
3
0

1
0
0

As expected, most couples were married (76.67%) when they filed their
tax returns but divorced (68.3%) when the requesting spouse sought relief.
Interestingly, 16.67% of requesting spouses filed for relief when widowed.
81. I.R.C. § 6015(f).
82. § 6015(f).
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This information contrasts a bit with the McMahon Study, where only 13%
sought relief when widowed and 25% sought relief while still married to
the non-requesting taxpayer.83 Here, only 2% were still married to the nonrequesting spouse when they filed for relief. Women who were divorced at
the time they filed for innocent spouse relief had a 45% rate of obtaining
relief. This statistic contrasts with the 30% chance women who were
widowed or separated had for relief. It is necessary to further explore how
domestic violence may impact a woman’s marital status and when she
chooses to file for relief. Additionally, in lieu of the relationship between
marital status and domestic violence, judges may need to revise how they
weigh the marital status factor in order for it to not serve as an inequitable
barrier to relief.
i. Widow Status Provides Safety from Retaliation for Abuse Victims.
When compared to the McMahon Study, the rise in the number of
women who brought abuse claims after their spouse was deceased may be
attributed to the very nature of the abusive relationship. As noted by
scholars, domestic abuse does not always end with the termination of the
relationship.84 Instead, abusers still have access to their victims through
joint custody of children or, ironically, shared marital debt.85 It has also
been stressed that a woman faces an increased risk of violence or homicide
in the time immediately following her separation or divorce from her
batterer.86 Filing for innocent spouse relief after a separation or divorce
may actually incite the batterer to retaliate. Therefore, it is not surprising
83. McMahon Study, supra note 59, at 663 (noting that women bring
approximately 84.3% of the trial cases and 88% of the appellate cases).
84. Orly Rachmilovitz, Bringing Down the Bedroom Walls: Emphasizing
Substance Over Form in Personalized Abuse, 14 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 495,
501 (2008) (“[W]hen the relationship comes to an end, the abuser may still exploit the
relationship, continuing to access the victim, carrying on the abusive and controlling
behavior.”); Lauren A. Kent, Comment, Addressing the Impact of Domestic Violence
on Children: Alternatives to Laws Criminalizing the Commission of Domestic Violence
in the Presence of a Child, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 1337, 1364 (2001) (arguing that in
situations of joint custody, abusers still have access to their victims even after divorce,
which allows them to continue abuse).
85. See Vicki Coggins, Domestic Violence—Using Children to Control, STANLY
NEWS
&
PRESS
(Feb.
22,
2012),
http://thesnaponline.com/opinion/x2136342002/Domestic-violence-using-children-tocontrol.
86. The rate of attack against women divorced from their husbands is twenty times
higher than that of married women. Further, it is estimated that 73% of emergency
room visits and up to 75% of calls to the police for domestic violence incidents occur
after separation. See Teresa Meuer & Kathryn Webster, Effects of Domestic Abuse on
Child Witnesses, 1997 WILEY FAM. L. UPDATE § 9.6, at 219.
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that many women do not feel safe filing for innocent spouse relief until
after their abuser is deceased.
The Tax Court needs to be increasingly cognizant of the increased risk of
violence following the termination of the relationship. According to this
study, women who were widowed at the time of filing for innocent spouse
relief only had a 30% chance of obtaining relief. In Lepordo v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue,87 for instance, the Tax Court did not
uphold a woman’s allegation of abuse nor grant her relief because her
husband was deceased and “not available to defend himself against the
abuse allegations or to otherwise verify them.”88 Although the judge may
have been trying to prevent a potentially false claim of abuse, he did not
consider whether the spouse did not seek relief while her husband was alive
because she feared the consequences.
Current Tax Court case law also reveals that judges are disinclined to
grant relief when the victim signed the contentious return after the
relationship had ended. For example, the court in O’Neil v. Commissioner
of Internal Revue did not find Mrs. O’Neil’s statement that she feared
retaliation if she did not sign the return to be credible because she was
legally separated from her husband when the return was signed.89 Despite
Mrs. O’Neil’s statement that she was threatened with “trouble” if she did
not sign the return, the court chose not to grant relief.90 Once again,
although there is an objective rule that examines the marital status of the
taxpayer, judges may need to view this factor with more scrutiny than in
instances where abuse has not been alleged.
ii. The Presence of Violence May Prevent a Woman from Obtaining a
Divorce.
An additional problem with the marital status factor is that courts do not
consider why a taxpayer may still be married to the spouse at the time relief
is sought, especially in instances where abuse has been alleged. In Sriram
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the requesting spouse was still
married to her husband at the time she filed for innocent spouse relief.91
The court failed to give weight to her argument that her cultural practices
prevented her from divorcing her husband.92 The requesting spouse in

87. Lepordo v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, No. 12911-06S, 2008 WL 65176, at
*1 (T.C. Jan. 7, 2008).
88. Id. at *9.
89. O’Neil v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 104 T.C.M. (CCH) 724, 733 (2012).
90. Id.
91. Sriram v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1482, 1487 (2012).
92. Id. at 1490.
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Wilson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue was prevented from divorcing
her abusive husband because she lacked the financial means to obtain a
divorce.93 In fact, her husband deliberately withheld finances from her so
that she could not seek legal assistance in both tax and divorce-related
matters.94
This judicial oversight is particularly problematic when judges are
considering whether to give weight to a taxpayer’s claim for abuse.95 For
instance, judges have maintained that abuse is not “serious enough” when
the couple was still married, shared joint custody of their children, or
maintained regular contact with one another.96 Tax Court judges are not
the only professionals who give in to stereotypes—domestic relations
mediators and family court judges awarding custody of children may also
lack the requisite knowledge about the complicated nature of domestic
abuse. Numerous studies show the frequency to which alleged abusers are
awarded sole or joint custody of minor children.97 Therefore, it should not
automatically count against a requesting spouse in an innocent spouse case
if she is still married to her abuser or shares children with him.
3. Domestic Abuse Victims’ Education and Work Experience
A final stereotype of the domestic violence victim is that the wife is from
a lower socioeconomic class and is both controlled by and reliant upon her
abusive husband.98 An appeal from the IRS’s denial of innocent spouse
relief to the Tax Court requires a significant amount of time and
93.
94.
95.
96.

Wilson v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 99 T.C.M. (CCH) 1552, 1554 (2010).
Id.
See infra Part II(C)(1)-(2).
See, e.g., Bruen v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 400, 403
(2009) (“Moreover, in spite of these allegations, the family court allowed Ms. Bruen
and Mr. Bruen to live together with their children for 9 months after their divorce.”).
97. Joan Zorza, How Abused Women Can Use the Law to Help Protect Their
Children, in END THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE: COMMUNITY RESPONSES TO CHILDREN OF
BATTERED WOMEN 147, 147-69 (E. Peled ed., 1995); Amy Levin & Linda G. Mills,
Fighting for Child Custody When Domestic Violence Is at Issue: Survey of State Laws,
48 SOCIAL WORK 463 (2003) (“There is ample evidence that judges fail to take the
violence seriously and award sole or joint custody to wife beaters. Many judges
believe that women either exaggerate men’s violence or otherwise deliberately alienate
their children from fathers during divorce to gain a custody advantage.”); see also M.B.
Liss et al., Domestic Violence and Child Custody, in BATTERING AND FAMILY
THERAPY: A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE 181, 181-83 (M. Hensen ed., 1993).
98. International Women’s Day: 10 Misconceptions About Domestic Violence
(Mar. 8, 2013, 2:50 PM) available at http://metro.co.uk/2013/03/08/internationalwomens-day-top-10-misconceptions-about-domestic-violence-3533055/;
Domestic
Violence
Myths,
BOSTON
UNIVERSITY,
available
at
http://www.bu.edu/police/prevention/domestic_violence_myth.htm
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resources.99 Thus, the numbers here may not present a completely accurate
picture of the victims seeking relief. Nevertheless, the charts do help to
dispel some victim stereotypes, while simultaneously raising some
interesting questions regarding the batterer’s control.

Less than
High
School
High
School/
GED
Some
College
College
Degree
PostGraduate

NonRequesting
Spouse Is
Primary
Earner
Requesting
Spouse Is
Primary
Earner

Education Level of Petitioning Spouse
Requesting Relief
Winning Relief
Husband Wife
Total Husband Wife
Total
0
3
3
0
0
0 (0%)

2

20

22

0

13

13
(59%)

0

6

6

0

6

2

10

12

1

6

6
(100%)
7 (58%)

0

2

2

0

1

1 (50%)

Employment
Requesting Relief
Husband Wife Total
1
32
33

4

16

20

Winning Relief
Husband Wife
Total
1
21
22
(69%)

0

5

5
(31%)

The charts demonstrate that victims seeking innocent spouse relief have
varying levels of education and that there does not seem to be any
99. For instance, it takes at least six months after a petition to the Tax Court is
filed for a case to be heard. See About the Court, US TAX COURT (2011)
https://www.ustaxcourt.gov/about.htm. Small cases often take a year to decide and
regular cases take much longer. Id. The problem with small tax cases is that taxpayers
are unable to appeal these decisions. Id. Additionally, interest also accrues on the
unpaid tax balance while the proceedings are pending. Id.
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correlation between an individual’s education and her prospects for relief.
When compared with the results of the McMahon Study, however, the
numbers are interestingly inverted. Importantly, this study details
situations where the individual requesting relief also alleged she suffered
from domestic abuse. The McMahon study, by contrast, also included cases
where the requesting spouse did not allege the presence of domestic abuse.
According to the McMahon Study, the number of women with college
degrees seeking innocent spouse relief were double that of women with
only a high school education.100 However, women in the McMahon Study
with college degrees were only 32% likely to obtain relief versus the 45%
of women with a high school education who obtained relief.101
Another difference between women filing for innocent spouse relief in
general and those alleging domestic abuse is the role they have in providing
for their families. Scholars have noted that abusers oftentimes control their
victims by forbidding them from working outside the home in an attempt to
isolate them.102 In this study, in over 60% of the cases where an individual
seeking innocent spouse relief stated she experienced domestic abuse, the
abuser was the primary wage earner in the family. In fact, other studies
have shown that there is a 50% chance that a battered woman will drop
below the poverty line when she leaves her abuser.103 However, the
statistics in this study stand in stark contrast to those in the McMahon
Study, where a mere 36% of non-requesting spouses were the primary
wage earners.104 Many studies have painted conflicting pictures as to
educational background and independent financial resources of victims and
perpetrators of domestic violence.105 Thus, it appears that the educational
100. McMahon Study, supra note 59, at 666. 104 of the individuals petitioning for
innocent spouse relief had at least a college degree, while thirty-two had only a high
school education. Id.
101. Id.
102. What Is Domestic Violence?, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (last updated Mar. 2013),
http://www.ovw.usdoj.gov/domviolence.htm; ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED
WOMEN KILL 1862 (1987).
103. Lisa Marie De Sanctis, Bridging the Gap Between the Rules of Evidence and
Justice for Victims of Domestic Violence, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 359, 368 (1996).
104. McMahon Study, supra note 59, at 667.
105. For example, in her study entitled Gender, Status, and Domestic Violence: An
Integration of Feminist and Family Violence Approaches, Dr. Kristin Anderson of
Western Washington University found that “men who have both higher and lower
educational resources than their female partners are more likely to perpetrate violence
acts than those possessing the same level of education as their female partners.” 59 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 655, 664 (August 1997). Dr. Anderson concluded that
socioeconomic status “is not a central mechanism through which race, education, age,
and cohabiting status are associated with domestic violence.” Id. Conversely, in the
empirical analysis conducted in For Women, Breadwinning Can Be Dangerous:
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background and socioeconomic status of both the victim and abuser are
relevant to the presence of abuse, but other factors such as culture, race,
and the individuals’ gender ideologies must also be considered.106
Nevertheless, Tax Court judges appear to be cognizant of the financial
dilemmas that plague a victim who not only faces a massive tax liability,
but also must be able to economically provide for herself when she was
previously dependent upon her abuser.
C. Definitions of Abuse
Tax Court judges must not only be aware of the ways in which victims
of abuse seeking tax relief differ from other taxpayers, but they must also
work towards understanding how to properly weigh allegations of abuse
within an innocent spouse case. Just as there are problematic victim
stereotypes, misconceptions also exist about what exactly constitutes abuse.
Many individuals have the misconception that domestic abuse frequently
involves physical violence and police intervention.107 Thus, when a
requesting spouse alleges she has suffered from mental or emotional abuse,
judges may be less inclined to grant relief because the type of abuse does
not conform to their misconceptions. Similarly, a woman who alleges
physical violence but fails to provide evidence of police reports or medical
documents may have a difficult time proving the abuse element in Tax
Court.108
The Tax Court’s narrow interpretation as to what constitutes abuse
recently garnered media attention. Certified Public Accountant Peter
Reilly wrote a December 2012 article for Forbes Magazine discussing the
Tax Court’s controversial O’Neil v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
decision.109 In O’Neil, Allison, the requesting spouse, alleged that her
Gendered Resource Theory and Wife Abuse, Drs. Maxine P. Atkinson and Theodore N.
Greenstein of North Carolina State University and Dr. Molly Monahan Lang of
Baldwin-Wlallace College concluded that “low-income husbands . . . are no more nor
less likely to abuse their wives than are high-income husbands.” 67 J. MARRIAGE &
FAM. 1137, 1145 (Dec. 2005). However, the authors noted that domestic violence may
be premised more on the husband’s gender ideology as opposed to earning potential.
Id. at 1146. For instance, “[w]hen men accept an ideology that defines masculinity in
relationship to being the breadwinner, and their wives earn a significant portion of
couple income, violence might be used to reassert dominance.” Id.
106. See sources in previous footnote.
107. In many cases, this popular mythology, created and retold by the media, is
extremely damaging to the prosecution, particularly when there is only one incident of
violence in a new relationship, such as a punch to the jaw, or where the defendant
claims that she was fighting back.
108. See infra Part II(C)(2)(a)-(b).
109. Peter J. Reilly, Tax Court Not Quick to Find Abuse in Innocent Spouse Case,
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husband “emotionally and psychologically” bullied her and threatened her
with “trouble” if she did not sign the return.110 Judge Holmes held that
Allison did not make a sufficient showing of abuse because she did not
present any documentation of the abuse.111 Reilly interviewed attorney
Cathy Brennan on her reaction to the O’Neil decision.112 Brennan replied
that the Tax Court took too narrow a view of abuse and that it “ignore[d]
the dynamics of an abusive relationship . . . [how] the abuser dominates all
aspects of his partner’s life and uses all tactics available to him to control
her.”113 In order to adequately address the needs of domestic violence
victims in the tax context, it is essential to explore where the Tax Court’s
misconceptions exist.
1. Introduction to Abuse in Innocent Spouse Cases
Many practitioners have hypothesized that there is a strong correlation
between whether a judge upholds an abuse claim and whether a judge
ultimately grants tax relief.114 An inquiry must be made whether the
opposite is also true. The following charts document the number of cases
since 1998 where abuse was alleged, the success of those claims, and
whether innocent spouse relief was granted.
Claims of Abuse
Total Abuse
Judge
Claims
Dismisses
Abuse Claims
Number of Cases
Taxpayer Wins

60
29

40
11

Judge
Upholds
Abuse
Claims
20
18

FORBES
MAGAZINE
(Dec.
18,
2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterjreilly/2012/12/18/tax-court-not-quick-to-find-abusein-innocent-spouse-case; see also O’Neil v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 104 T.C.M.
(CCH) 724, 733 (2012).
110. O’Neil, 104 T.C.M. (CCH) at 733.
111. Id. (stating that “Allison appears not to have had a happy marriage with
Michael . . . [b]ut we have no basis to find “bullying” or intimidation here—much less
more substantial abuse.”).
112. See Reilly, supra note 110.
113. Id.
114. See Aiding Innocent Spouses from Joint Tax Liabilities, supra note 11.
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Total
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4
2
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In 66.67% of the cases in which abuse was alleged, the judge found that
there was no abuse. Furthermore, tax practitioners’ hypotheses are
correct—there is in fact a correlation between the judicial recognition of
abuse and an ultimate grant of relief. In 90% of the cases where abuse was
found, the taxpayer was ultimately granted equitable relief. On the
contrary, if the taxpayer’s abuse claim was dismissed, there was only a
27.5% chance that the judge would grant relief. The strong correlation
between a finding of abuse and ultimate tax relief necessitates a greater
understanding of the dynamics of domestic abuse as well as consistent
application of judicially created factors in analyzing whether the abuse
claim should be upheld to ensure equitable relief.
2. Criteria for a Finding of Abuse
The sharp decline of abuse claims that were upheld in 2012 may mean
that judicial interpretation of what constitutes a successful allegation is
shifting. Although initially designed to give judges discretion in handling
the unfamiliar issue of domestic abuse, the lack of both a clear definition of
abuse as well as a non-exhaustive list of criteria have proved
problematic.115 The only guidance for judges comes from Revenue Ruling
2003-61, which requires that the requesting spouse was a victim of abuse
prior to the time the return was signed and that, because of the abuse, she

115. Nihiser v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1531, 1539 (2008).
Black’s Law Dictionary defines abuse as “physical or mental maltreatment, often
resulting in mental, emotional, sexual, or physical injury.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
10 (9th ed. 2009).
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did not challenge any items on the return for fear of retaliation.116 This
Revenue Ruling grants Tax Court judges too much discretion and provides
little guidance in determining an issue with which they have no experience.
Furthermore, the criteria enunciated by some judges are either ignored or
misapplied by other judges, thus creating an ambiguous and often
unachievable standard.
Dismissed Claims Versus Upheld Claims: What Is the Difference?
Requesting
Police
PPO Issued
Spouse in
Intervention
Therapy
4
10
2
Dismissed
Claims
3
10
5
Upheld
Claims
Reasons Provided for Dismissing Abuse Claims
Reasons
Mentioned in Case
Dismissing Abuse
5
Specificity Issues
5
Return Signed Post-Separation, “Could
Not Be Abused at the Time of Signing,”
and/or “Did Not Sign Out of Fear”
2
Substance Abuse Addiction Not Enough
18
Did Not Corroborate
1
Did Not Mitigate Knowledge
Requirement
8
Behavior Did Not Rise to Level of Abuse
i. The Need for Corroboration
Judges have held that a claim of abuse must be corroborated to weigh in
favor of the requesting spouse.117 However, the amount of evidence
necessary to provide corroboration is unclear. For instance, in Collier v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the requesting spouse insisted she
116. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-32 I.R.B. 296.
117. See Pullins v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 136 T.C. 432, 454 (2011);

Venables v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, No. 22068-08S, 2010 WL 1980316, at *7
(T.C. May 18, 2010); Bruen v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 400,
410 (2009); Fox v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 731, 736 (2006);
Bright v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, No. 3839-04S, 2005 WL 2444050, at *4 (T.C.
Oct. 4, 2005); Rooks v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, No. 11874-02S, 2003 WL
21350037, at *4 (T.C. June 11, 2003).
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suffered constant verbal and mental abuse from her husband during their
marriage.118 Mrs. Collier introduced testimony from a friend who
witnessed the verbal lashings as well as testimony from a psychologist who
treated her for depression.119 The Tax Court, however, found her friend’s
testimony to be “conclusory and lacking in any specificity” and the
psychologist’s testimony to not “establish[]” abuse.120 Consequently, Mrs.
Colllier’s abuse claim was denied.121 Conversely, in Chadwick v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Tax Court held that, although the
only evidence of physical and emotional abuse was Mrs. Chadwick’s own
testimony, it was “credible” enough to establish that she was abused during
her marriage.122
Although sufficient corroborating evidence is necessary to protect
against frivolous allegations, Tax Court judges have failed to recognize that
some victims cannot produce corroborating evidence because of the very
nature of the abuse. Domestic violence is well-known to be a common, yet
under-reported, crime.123 Estimates provide that victims report only 14.5%
of serious assaults to the police.124 Nevertheless, a spokesperson from the
New South Wales Women’s Refuge Movement Working Party Inc.
described the misconceptions that still existed, stating that “[t]he word of a
woman making an allegation of violence . . . without documented evidence
is treated with disbelief, without providing opportunities for corroboration
by other means.”125 Many victims fail to disclose instances of abuse for
fear of retaliation, endangering her children, and shame.126 Additionally,
118.
119.
120.
121.

Collier v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1790, 1799 (2002).
Id.
Id.
See id. at 1791 (finding that Ms. Collier failed to carry her burden of showing

abuse).
122. Chadwick v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, No. 4991-04S, 2005 WL 2649124,
at *18 (T.C. Oct. 17, 2005).
123. See SHANNAN M. CATALANO, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL CRIME
VICTIMIZATION SURVEY: CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2003, at 1 (2003) (showing only
48% of all violent victimizations being reported).
124. KRISTIN A. KELLY, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE POLITICS OF PRIVACY 3
(2003).
125. New South Wales Women’s Refuge Movement Working Party Inc,
Submission FV 188 (June 25, 2010); see also K. Johnstone, Submission FV 107 (June
7, 2010).
126. See Barbara R. Barreno, In Search of Guidance: An Examination of Past,
Present, and Future Adjudications of Domestic Violence Asylum Claims, 64 VAND. L.
REV. 225, 243 (2011) (“Domestic violence is viewed as a “hidden problem,” and its
victims are often “invisible” to society because they choose not to disclose their
situations for such reasons as fear, shame, and the social stigma attached to abuse.”);
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many victims do not want to bring claims of abuse out of the private sphere
into a courtroom in emotional and intrusive trials.127 Thus, many who seek
innocent spouse relief will not have a paper trail of police reports or
personal protection orders.
Some victims, such as the requesting spouse in Collier v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, may only have a friend or family member who can
provide some corroboration of abuse. While some judges do not give
weight to this form of corroboration, others do. In Thomassen v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the court upheld a claim of abuse that
was corroborated by the requesting spouse’s children and family friends,
even though no other evidence was presented.128 Judges need to be mindful
of the discrepancies in their criteria. Furthermore, judges need to be
cognizant that some requesting spouses may not even have family members
or friends to corroborate the allegations. A key tactic utilized by abusers is
isolation to instill dependence and cut the victim off from outside
resources.129 Thus, abusers often isolate victims from friends and family
members, thus preventing the victims from confiding instances of abuse in
these individuals.130
Furthermore, as noted by some Tax Court judges, victims do not check
the box on the Innocent Spouse Relief Request Form 8857 indicating that
they have been abused.131 By law, the IRS is required to contact the
Leigh Goodmark, Telling Stories, Saving Lives: The Battered Mother’s Testimony
Project, Women’s Narratives, and Court Reform, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 709, 744 n.186
(2005) (“[W]omen are actually reluctant to disclose abuse to legal system
professionals, particularly in custody cases, because of fear of both the abuser and the
system’s perception of women who make such claims.”) (citing Martha Albertson
Fineman, Domestic Violence, Custody, and Visitation, 36 FAM. L. Q. 211, 222-23
(2002)).
127. Joy M. Bingham, Protecting Victims by Working Around the System and
Within the System: Statutory Protections for Emotional Abuse in the Domestic Violence
Context, 81 N.D. L. REV. 837, 843 (2005); PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXTENT, NATURE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER
VIOLENCE: FINDINGS FROM THE NAT’L VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY (July
2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/181867.pdf (“Most victims of
intimate partner violence do not consider the justice system an appropriate vehicle for
resolving conflicts with intimates.”).
128. Thomassen v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1397, 1409
(2011).
129. Coercive Control, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 166, 169 (Nicky
Ali Jackson ed., 2007).
130. Id.
131. See Pullins v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 136 T.C. 432, 453 (2011) (noting
that the requesting spouse failed to “check the box” that she had been abused during the
relationship).
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requesting spouse’s partner or former partner for the opportunity to
intervene in the case, even in instances of domestic violence.132 Although
the IRS does not disclose personal information to the alleged abuser during
the pendency of the innocent spouse petition, if the case is appealed to the
Tax Court, all of this information will become available to the abuser.133
Thus, a woman may be dissuaded from filing to obtain relief or alleging
abuse because of the presence of her abuser.134
ii. Police Intervention and Personal Protection Orders
An interesting consideration is whether the presence of a police report
would provide sufficient corroboration for an abuse claim to be successful.
Courts have reached divergent results. For instance, in McKnight v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the requesting spouse alleged numerous
instances of physical violence in the relationship with her deceased
husband.135 The police were called to the home on two separate incidents
following violent altercations.136 The court acknowledged that, although
Mrs. McKnight did not want to press criminal charges against her husband
or seek medical treatment for fear of the consequences to her husband, her
claim for abuse was sufficiently corroborated by the presence of the police
report.137 Conversely, in Sotuyo v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the
requesting spouse also introduced a police report into evidence that detailed
an incident of domestic violence where the wife was the victim.138 The
court, however, dismissed the abuse claim and held that “[the wife’s]
evidence of abuse does not rise to the level of abuse that would keep her
from challenging the omission of income for fear of [her husband’s]
retaliation.”139
132. IRS Innocent Spouse Questions and Answers, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/Innocent-Spouse-Questions-&-Answers (last visited
Feb. 28, 2014). However, to protect the requesting spouse’s privacy, the IRS will not
disclose her personal information.
133. Id. Under Tax Court Rule 27(d)(1), the requesting spouse can request a
protective order from the court to require redaction of personal information.
134. See Evidence of Family Violence: Difficulties in Giving Evidence,
L.
REFORM
COMM’N,
AUSTRALIAN
http://www.alrc.gov.au/publications/18.%20Evidence%20of%20Family%20Violence/d
ifficulties-giving-evidence (citing Victorian Law Reform Commission, Review of
Family Violence Laws: Report § 11.1 (2006)).
135. McKnight v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 92 T.C.M. (CCH) 76, 85 (2006).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Sotuyo v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, No. 25692-10S, 2012 WL 1021306, at
*5 (T.C. March 27, 2012).
139. Id.; see also Ladehoff v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, No. 16814-10S, 2012
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Additionally, when a woman reports an incident of domestic violence,
“the belief that it is a private matter continues to play a significant role.
The refusal of the police to arrest offenders and the reluctance of judges to
sentence them has been widely documented.”140 Thus, many judges do not
consider instances where a woman tries to obtain assistance or create a
paper trail of her abuse, but her efforts are rebuffed by law enforcement
and the justice system.
iii. Verbal and Mental Abuse
Tax Court judges have expressed hesitancy in upholding an abuse claim
when no physical abuse was alleged.141 They fear that these verbal, mental,
and financial abuse allegations naturally “spring from the dissolution of
troubled marriages, and there is an obvious incentive to vilify the nonrequesting spouse.”142 Below is a chart that describes the various types of
abuse that requesting spouses bring.

Physical
Number
of
Claims
Claims
Upheld

18
6

Types of Claims
Verbal
Mental/
Addiction
Emotional
4
11
1
0

1

0

Combination
24
12

In Nihiser v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the court posed the
question of whether “psychological mistreatment” without the presence of
physical abuse could be enough.143 The requesting spouse in Nihiser never
alleged that her former spouse physically abused her.144 Instead, she stated
that her husband verbally abused her, suffered from a drug addiction, and

WL 612501, at *3 (T.C. Feb. 27, 2012) (holding that the evidence of battery contained
in two police reports “does not rise to the level of abuse that would keep him from
challenging the treatment of the items on the return for fear of his ex-wife’s
retaliation”).
140. KELLY, supra note 127, at 3.
141. See Nihiser v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1531, 1540
(2008) (noting that “[w]e are aware of the danger that requesting spouses, in trying to
escape financial liability, may easily exaggerate the level of nonphysical abuse”).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1541.
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oftentimes threatened to commit suicide.145 The Nihiser opinion was the
first time the Tax Court recognized the various ways batterers could exert
control over their spouses without physically harming them—isolation,
threatening to commit suicide, engaging in drug abuse, and using degrading
language, to name a few.146 The court did not choose to make these various
factors dispositive, but rather referred to them as “objective indications”
that abuse was present in the relationship, and not “just a deviation from
the ideal of marital harmony.”147
iv. The Interplay of Financial Abuse
A final issue that continues to perplex the Tax Court is whether financial
control could potentially be its own “category” of abuse, including whether
it should provide circumstantial evidence of other types of abuse and
whether it could mitigate other factors such as whether the requesting
spouse had “knowledge” of the misstatements on the income tax return. As
evidenced below, abuse victims are often unaware of their tax and financial
situations because the non-requesting spouse strictly controls this
information.

Wife Controls
Finances & Seeks
Relief
Wife Controls
Finances/Husband
Seeks Relief
Husband Controls
Finances & Seeks
Relief
Husband Controls
Finances/Wife
Seeks Relief
Separate Finances
Both Controlled

Family Finances
Number Percentage
of Cases
of Cases
2
3.27%

Number
Won
0

Winning
Percentage
0%

2

3.27%

1

50%

2

3.27%

0

0%

30

49%

19

63%

1
24

1.64%
39.34%

0
9

0%
37.5%

145. Id.
146. Id. at 1542 (quoting MARY ANN DOUGLAS, The Battered Woman Syndrome, in

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL
VIOLENCE 39 (Daniel Jay Sonkin ed., 1987)).
147. Id.
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Additional Financial Information
Requesting Spouse
Requesting Spouse
Had No Conception of
Received an
Finances
Allowance
Number of Cases
Number Won
Winning Percentage

17
11
65%

14
9
64%

In Bishop v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the requesting spouse, a
college-educated accountant, was denied access to the couple’s bank
account by her spouse.148 She was only given a weekly allowance to pay
for the couple’s groceries.149 Although Mrs. Bishop did not allege that her
ex-husband physically abused her, the Tax Court upheld her claim of
mental and emotional abuse in part because of the evidence of financial
control.150 Several years prior, however, the Tax Court had dismissed a
requesting spouse’s abuse claim even though the facts were very similar to
the Bishop case. In Smith v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Tax
Court disbelieved the requesting spouse’s argument that her ex-husband
had controlled all of the family’s finances prior to their divorce.151 Part of
the Tax Court’s denial of her claim stemmed from the fact that because she
was a nurse and “neither uneducated nor intelligent . . . we do not believe
that she would have been . . . oblivious about the family resources from
which the taxes could have been paid.”152 The judicial reluctance to accept
the presence of abuse is very troubling, especially since many women can
produce evidence of financial abuse but may not have corroborating
evidence of physical abuse. Thus, the recognition of the seriousness of
financial abuse as a form of control in and of itself, as well as an
underlying precursor of other types of abuse, could be crucial in permitting
more victims, especially those that lack corroborating evidence of abuse, to
obtain innocent spouse relief.
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
On January 6, 2012, the IRS issued a proposed revenue procedure that

148. Bishop v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, No. 7595-06S, 2008 WL 852028, at
*2-4 (T.C. Mar. 31, 2008).
149. Id.
150. Id. at *18.
151. Smith v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue , 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 963, 967 (2001).
152. Id. at 969.
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would alter the way innocent spouse relief requests would be handled under
Section 6015(f).153 Notice 2012-8, which explains the proposed regulation,
focuses in part on how the presence of abuse may impact a spouse’s
willingness and ability to challenge misstatements on a return.154 This
proposed regulation is a step in the right direction, but more guidance must
be provided on what criteria judges should examine when they choose
whether to uphold or dismiss a claim for abuse. In particular, many victims
do not possess vital documents, such as police reports or personal
protection orders that many judges essentially require.155 In addition to the
beneficial changes proposed in Notice 2012-8, there needs to be further
emphasis on what circumstantial evidence judges should consider in their
investigation.
A. Considering Family Finances and Economic Circumstances Throughout
the Relationship
As explained by this Article, there is no single profile of the average
domestic abuse victim seeking tax relief.156 The education level of the
various taxpayers, for example, are exceptionally diverse. Nevertheless,
despite the victim’s education and employment qualifications, a persistent
theme in the data was the economic dependence and financial control
exerted by the alleged abusive spouse.157 In over half of the cases (53%),
the non-requesting spouse had absolute control over the family finances.158
Many requesting spouses additionally reported that they were either given a
strict allowance by the alleged abuser or had no conception of the couple’s
financial situation whatsoever.159 What is especially telling about these
cases is that requesting spouses were only making allegations of physical,
verbal, or emotional abuse—not financial abuse per se.160 Thus, the
presence of financial control seems to underlie many of the allegations of
abuse.
Currently, there is no regulation that considers how the presence of
financial control may serve as circumstantial evidence for a claim of abuse.
In instances where a requesting spouse cannot provide documented
153. This proposed revenue procedure, if adopted, would supersede Rev. Proc.
2003-61, 2003-32 I.R.B. 296.
154. Examination of Returns and Claims for Refund, Credit, or Abatement:
Determination of Correct Liability, 26 C.F.R. § 601.105 (2013).
155. See discussion supra Part II(C)(1)-(2).
156. See discussion supra Part II(B)(3).
157. See discussion supra Part II(C)(2)(d).
158. See discussion supra Part II(C)(2)(d).
159. See discussion supra Part II(C)(2)(d).
160. See discussion supra Part II(C)(2)(c).
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evidence of abuse to sufficiently corroborate her allegations, courts should
consider the presence of financial abuse as a factor. The same controlling
behavior that manifests itself in financial abuse could naturally carryover
into other types of behavior.
Additionally, the presence of financial abuse can be used to supplement
many of the other factors under Revenue Ruling 2003-61. For instance,
one of the factors entitled “knowledge or reason to know” requires that the
requesting spouse “did not know and had no reason to know of the item
giving rise to the deficiency.”161 Financial abuse coupled with allegations
of other types of abuse could singlehandedly provide enough evidence for
the taxpayer to be successful on this knowledge factor. If the victim of
domestic violence does not have any knowledge of the couple’s finances
and faces some form of abuse whenever she asks about financial matters,
she should be granted relief under this factor. Thus, the proposed
regulation should include a section discussing this suggestion and the
underlying rationale.
B. Instances of Inconsistent Allegations in Various Proceedings:
Considering the Period After the Separation
An additional consideration that perplexes many judges is why women
do not allege the presence of domestic violence in divorce proceedings or
even on their innocent spouse request forms, but do so later when the case
is before the IRS or Tax Court.162 Although judges fear the woman may be
lying about or exaggerating the abuse, judges fail to recognize that a
woman may have been afraid to disclose this information at an earlier
proceeding or unwilling to handle the legal repercussions of the disclosure
at the time.163 Therefore, an addition to the proposed regulation might
provide for a situation where a woman’s abuse claim has not been
consistent across her innocent spouse or other legal proceedings. In
analyzing whether the taxpayer’s election to allege abuse is credible, judges
should consider factors such as (1) the length of time between legal
proceedings where abuse was not alleged and the current innocent spouse
case, (2) whether the non-requesting spouse resides in close proximity to
the victim or whether he has relocated, (3) whether the victim and abuser
are in new personal relationships, and (4) whether there are children from
the marriage.
A victim of abuse who is separated from her abuser by time, physical
distance, and legal obligations may no longer be in fear of her former
161. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-32 I.R.B. 296.
162. See discussion infra Part II(C)(1).
163. See discussion infra Part II(C)(1).
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spouse retaliating against her if she alleges that the relationship was
plagued by abuse. Furthermore, scholars have detailed the potential
psychological traumas that accompany an abusive relationship—namely, a
woman’s inability to realize the direness of her situation or her attempts to
make excuses for her spouse.164 Thus, a victim may not initially consider
her situation to be one of direness or even abuse; she may need some time
apart from the batterer’s control to actually come to terms with the nature
of the relationship. Thus, a requesting spouse should not be penalized
when she maintains she was not abused in one instance but alleges abuse
during her innocent spouse case.
CONCLUSION
Although innocent spouse relief has been in existence for a number of
years, judges are still grappling with many of the intricacies of the factors
promulgated by Revenue Ruling 2003-61. Domestic abuse is a concept not
normally addressed by Tax Court judges and tax practitioners alike. Even
the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the IRS, and various Tax Court
judges have acknowledged that they are not well-versed in the complexities
of domestic violence.165 Thus, more needs to be done to ensure that
requesting taxpayers who are victims of domestic abuse have the ability to
attain equitable relief or, perhaps more significantly, that these individuals
are not barred from relief simply because the presiding judge does not
understand the intricacies of a relationship plagued by domestic violence.

164. MARGI LAIRD MCCUE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 21
(2008) (“Denial and minimization enable a woman to live with what is happening and
to avoid feelings of terror and humiliation.”); PETER G. JAFFE ET AL., CHILD CUSTODY
AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A CALL FOR SAFETY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 35 (2003)
(“Because secrecy, denial, and cover-up are all integral threads in the fabric of
violence, clinically validating a history of domestic violence requires sophisticated and
sensitive interviewing skills.”).
165. See, e.g., Bernie Becker, Advocate: IRS Needs Greater Understanding of
Domestic Violence, HILL (Jan. 11, 2012, 8:25 PM) (stating that IRS employees need
more of an understanding of abuse victims).
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